Abstract
Turkey has been an official candidate for accession to the European Union since 1999, when accession talks began under the new rules of the enlargement policy. Since then Turkey's candidacy has been stalled as a result of ‘enlargement fatigue’ and the evolving EU political scenario, in which membership largely depends on successful institutional reform. This article analyses the strengths and weaknesses of Turkey's candidacy.
Is the EU ready to enlarge further? The question is so loaded that even the staunchest EU federalist is tempted to consider a limit to enlargement. The problem, however, is that the very question presupposes ‘no’ as an answer. In my opinion, the appropriate question should be: ‘Is it in the EU's interest to enlarge further?’ Considered from this angle, the enlargement policy acquires another dimension. I would like to revisit the problematic Turkish accession from this viewpoint, in order to refute the present reactionary standpoint.
On 31 July 2009, the Republic of Turkey's bid to join the European Union was half a century old. No other candidate country has gone through such a long period of time before becoming a member of the EU, but probably no other candidate has benefited to such an extent from the EU's transformative dynamics, either. Turkey's candidacy was reviewed in 1999 in keeping with the new rules of the enlargement policy deriving from the end of the Cold War and the sense of urgency to cope with the new fait accompli. Although a long-time candidate, Turkey was asked to comply with the new criteria designed for the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, Turkey was considered part of the new Europe that was taking shape in the post-Soviet era. The political-philosophical approach behind including Turkey in the EU's latest enlargement cycle originates with the ‘Laeken spirit’ that emerged at the 2001 Laeken Summit. However, the idea of a new Europe as a future political entity has faded away as quickly as it has developed.
Turkey, as a substantial part of the future political Europe, has benefited considerably from the enlargement dynamics, despite all odds. But so has Europe, despite a deep disregard for those achievements which paved the way, for the first time in recent history, for a common future with a country—Turkey—that has otherwise been considered as the role model for Europe's perennial ‘Other’.
Today, Turkey's pre-accession process that started 10 years ago, in December 1999, is at a standstill. Its outcome, whether positive or negative, will have implications which will go beyond Turkey and beyond Europe.
The end of the ‘Laeken spirit’
The ‘Laeken spirit’ was the climax of a political project based on solidarity and partnership in the European continent and beyond. It was a response to the emerging situation in Europe after the end of the Cold War in 1989. The Europeans crowned this project—which in a way signalled the rebirth of the continent—by launching work on a European Constitution at the Laeken Summit (near Brussels) in late 2001.
We know the rest. Since the Laeken Summit, the project of a Europe based on federalist principles and constitutional citizenship has begun to fade in spirit. Because of petty national calculations, outdated hostilities and short-sighted politicians whose attitudes underestimate successful EU policies that cast a shadow on their poor performances, the wind has turned to the opposite direction.
The enlargement process, one of the most crucial policies of the EU until Laeken, has suffered noticeably. Unable to appreciate the successes of the enlargement, Europeans started humming and whining. They took a position against the enlargement nations, whether Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland or Turkey, without discrimination.
Turkey's membership bid has therefore suffered from the vanishing of the Laeken spirit. ‘Enlargement fatigue’ has taken over and Turkey is now perceived as a burden, a hump on the back of a Europe that has lost the Laeken spirit for good. European policymakers have begun to consider the Turkey dossier as a crisis management case.
The rationale to include Turkey
However, the decision to include Turkey in the latest enlargement cycle and to invite it to join the European family was not an act of charity. It was a genuine political act, taking common and mutual interests into full consideration. Through the integration process, the EU's aim has been to lay the foundations for sustainable economic, political and social stability in Turkey. In turn, normalisation and stability in Turkey, as well as in the former candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, was considered the best guarantee for the freedom, peace, security and stability of the continent as a whole. Turkey has been invited to join in this strategic project, wherein the interests of all actors are intertwined. In concrete terms, the integration process would avert centrifugal temptations that might emerge if Turkey were kept out of the European integration process. Similarly, issues high on the common agenda, such as the Cyprus question, the dispute with Greece over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, relations with northern Iraq, rejected asylum seekers, unauthorised migration, and drug and human trafficking, could be better tackled if Turkey were included in the joint consultative mechanisms of the EU. Other considerations include the potential advantages of Turkey's young and dynamic population, the economic attractiveness of an unsaturated market of 70 million consumers, the economies of scale that could be generated with its southern and eastern neighbours as well as with the Central Asian states that are ethnically kin to Turkey, the strategic value of the second largest army of NATO and the geographic position of Turkey's landmass regarding the energy routes. A concrete achievement in this last area has recently come to the fore with the signing of a multiparty partnership for the gas pipeline Nabucco on July 2009.
Integrating a secular but predominantly Islamic country into an ensemble where Christian values shape the common references for the majority of citizens, however, much they live in a secular environment, was and still is a huge challenge in itself. The political leaders of the EU have taken this politically courageous decision to demonstrate that
Turkey would have much to gain from the process of integration as well. It would have the opportunity of benefiting from the experience and techniques of its partners as it completes a 200-year-old modernisation process; a process in which Turkey is still only halfway towards attaining a genuinely stable and prosperous democracy. Turkey would learn to live without having to be aware of enemies surrounding it; it would be able to reconcile first with itself and then with its arch-enemies. It would have the opportunity to rediscover its past, confront its memory and history and revisit certain customs it has had to sacrifice in the attempt to acquire a European appearance. All this would be realised in an environment of mutual confidence which would enable Turkey to feel at home in Europe.
A local versus a universal Europe
The advantages of EU enlargement should not, however, be solely reduced to their strategic and somehow utilitarian dimensions. Enlargement is a major step towards the establishment of a Europe that is a worldwide political power, as was foreseen by its founders Adenauer, Monnet, Schuman and Spinelli. Enlargement towards the east would serve this courageous universal solidarity project that urges us to rethink the very substance of Europe as it exists today. In this sense, there is a direct link between the debate on the EU's enlargement and that on its enhanced integration.
Within the context of this new dynamic, the added value of the problematic Turkish candidacy, which crystallises so many negative connotations and subconscious fears, lies precisely in overcoming these fears and images through the integration of Europe's archetypal figure of the Other, the
Back to a local Europe?
This ideal framework did not last long. At the same time that reforms in Turkey were slowing down, the EU was taking things easy, constantly appeasing the situation. We should understand that Turkey's open-ended accession talks with ‘no guarantee’ regarding its full membership and the staunch French opposition towards its membership emptied the conditionality principle of its substance. The conditionality principle is roughly a ‘stick and carrot’ approach. During the last enlargement, the EU owed the stability in Central and Eastern Europe to this principle. Candidates were asked to follow the Copenhagen Criteria, to meet membership obligations in order to become members of the EU. And at the end they joined the European Union.
Conversely, in the case of Turkey, a sort of negative conditionality took over whereby Member States having a difficult relationship with Turkey (like the Republic of Cyprus) exploited the negotiation process to ask, either through new techniques or old Brussels tactics (opening benchmarks, prominence of the Council over the executive body the Commission) for unrealistic requirements regarding Turkey. Today several negotiation chapters are blocked because of such negative conditionality. 1 Completing this unenthusiastic tableau is the failure of Turkey's AKP (Justice and Development Party) government to duly recognise the opposition in Europe against enlargement, and thus, its failure to press onwards in its EU work despite all odds.
As of November 2009, Turkey and the EU have opened 11 chapters for negotiations: (4) Free Circulation of Capital; (6) Company Law; (7) Intellectual Property Law; (10) Information Society and Media; (16) Taxation; (18) Statistics; (20) Enterprise and Industrial Policy; (21) Trans-European Networks; (25) Science and Research (provisionally closed); (28) Consumer and Health Protection; and (32) Financial Control. For the sake of comparison, Turkey's negotiating partner Croatia has opened 22 chapters and closed seven of them. Eight other chapters have been frozen since December 2006 for non-compliance with the requirements of the Additional Protocol to the customs union agreement, namely Turkey's inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus within the customs union framework as a new member. These chapters are: (1) Free Movement of Goods; (3) Freedom to Provide Services; (9) Financial Services; (11) Agriculture; (13) Fisheries; (14) Transport Policy; (29) Customs Union; and (30) External Relations. Five chapters are technically frozen due the position of France, who refuses to let those chapters pertaining to full membership to be opened for negotiations, in line with its government's policy to block full membership of Turkey: (11) Agriculture; (17) Economic and Monetary Policy; (22) Regional policy; (33) Budget; and (34) Institutions. Moreover, there are chapters like Public Procurement for which the opening benchmarks are highly unlikely to be met by Turkey due to a blurred final perspective.
A European Union with no solid perspective to offer Turkey has handled the relationship for the last 5 years with annual progress reports and feeble statements heard once in a while, using the excuse of elections and political troubles to speak out even less, and with nothing straightforward to say to the Turkish government or public on the matter.
Even Turkey's closest ‘friends’ avoided warning the government about neglected work, delayed steps and backward moves in implementing reforms. Encouragements in words have never turned into deeds. The EU has made vague statements such as ‘If you work hard, you'll win’, or ‘The road to the EU is long and hard.’ Although totally irrelevant to the Turkish situation, difficulties that Britain, Spain and even Sweden (!) once faced were offered as examples to calm down Turkey, just as one would calm down a child.
The appeasement approach of the EU stemmed from not knowing what to do, rather than from intentions to protect the ruling AKP. Sheer ineptitude! Some Member States, instead of inviting Turkey to get on the right track, were pleased to see Turkey lagging behind in its EU adhesion work. The more the preparations for membership fail, the more the relations turn cold and the longer Turkey remains outside the EU. France is a typical case in that it is opposed to Turkey's membership, yet says not a single word about the Turkish government's flaws or eventual successes in political reform. Such an approach is uncreative and harmful to the interests of all parties.
Membership perspective as a conditio sine qua non
The following is still very much valid: a Turkey that does not see EU membership in its future will have difficulties absorbing the political and economic freedoms and the democratic environment resulting from the EU-inspired reforms of 2002-2004, and will fail to rid itself of old habits and fears in conducting business. The lack of perspective will act as a powerful disincentive. A clear test of this assessment will be the outcome of the new Kurdish initiative taken by the government in the summer of 2009, in which any groundbreaking and sustainable reformist path would need to be established through a long-term EU membership perspective.
Otherwise why is an EU perspective so important? Let's disregard the fears relating to anti-secularism and separatism; even an ordinary civil servant who stands no chance of becoming an EU citizen would not be fond of an EU-related reorganisation of his or her department. In this case, both the civil servant and Turkey will fall back on familiar patterns, despite the fact that the old equilibrium has been disrupted since the beginning of the EU accession process in 1999.
Thus, the reason behind the slow pace of the negotiations is due not only to the revenge policy of the Republic of Cyprus or the incredulity of the French President, but also to the unwillingness or hesitancy of Turkish authorities to engage in economic and political sacrifices without having a guarantee of eventual EU membership.
Finally both parties are responsible, the Turkish leaders as much as the European politicians who carefully avoided giving an accession perspective to Turkey, pushing the country around by displaying contrasting and misleading attitudes regarding its accession.
Despite this overall negative trend, in December 2008 the government approved the third version of the National Programme for the Adoption of the
A legal document prepared by the European Commission, ratified by the European Council and systematically updated, the Accession Partnership announces the general requirements a candidate should fulfil in short, medium and long terms in order to comply with EU regulations.
Turkey's EU partners, for their part, are caught up with the global economic turmoil, not to mention the tale of the Lisbon Treaty and the ongoing enlargement fatigue. Within this framework, EU politicians need to fully assess the ongoing negative trend in relations with Turkey and take decisive steps to revive the conditionality principle as well as confidence in Turkey's potential.
Offering an accession date to Turkey is essential
In view of the unconstructive statements from some EU Member States' politicians, it is highly improbable that an agreement will be reached among the EU-27 to replace Turkey's membership perspective, approved on 14 December 2004, with a second-class status. Turkey's membership prospects can only be revitalised with a move forward. And the move to reinvigorate the process depends as much on Turkey's will as it does on what would be a very powerful message from the EU: a public statement of an accession date. Taking into account the prevailing political, economic and budgetary constraints, the year 2023, the centenary year of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, sounds very reasonable.
However, there seems to be a silent opposition to this prospect. Some observers argue that 2023 is too far away. Bearing in mind the state of preparations in Turkey, the anti-Turkish mood in Europe and the time necessary for the ratification of accession treaties in national parliaments, 2023 is actually too close. It should be recalled that another ‘big’ candidate, Poland, worked for 15 years starting in 1989 to reach Western standards before becoming member in 2004. In the very beginning of its relationship with what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) in early 1960s, Turkey asked the EEC for a transition period of 22-24 years before the completion of a customs union. The demand was found too unrealistic and too distant by the EEC authorities at the outset. However, realising the necessity of in-depth economic transformation, they agreed to grant that period, at the end of which, in 1995, Turkey successfully concluded a customs union with the EU.
In addition, an accession date of 2023 is distant enough to placate some European politicians. Moreover, a tentative date is the most precious incentive for Turks, who are impatient by temperament but are stimulated by tangible perspectives. This has been proven on two previous occasions: first, when Turkey negotiated the major agreement with the EU concerning the customs union, for which the end of 1995 was a deadline; and again in 2002 at the Copenhagen European Council, when the EU-15 gave Turkey the target of the end of 2004 to comply with its Political Criteria. Both deadlines were successfully met.
Others who argue that no accession date was given to previous candidates should refer to the presidency conclusions of the Helsinki and Nice European Councils held in 1999 and 2000, respectively. At the time candidates had already been negotiating, some since March 1998 and the rest since February 2000.
The Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999), chapter 1, paragraph 5 reads:
The Union has made a firm political commitment to make every effort to complete the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform by December 2000, to be followed by ratification. After ratification of the results of that Conference the Union should be in a position to welcome new Member States from the end of 2002 as soon as they have demonstrated their ability to assume the obligations of membership and once the negotiating process has been successfully completed.
The Nice European Council (7-9 December 2000), chapter 2, paragraph 6 reads:
In the European Council's view, that strategy, together with the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform, will place the Union, in accordance with the objective set by the European Council in Helsinki, in a position to welcome those new Member States which are ready as from the end of 2002, in the hope that they will be able to take part in the next European Parliament elections.
Some other observers argue that the accession year offered to Bulgaria and Romania has proven to be counterproductive, stalling the reforms necessary to meet membership obligations because membership was, in a way, guaranteed. But hardly any new Member State (and even some old ones) has fully complied with the membership criteria at the date of accession.
Realistically, no one today should expect the EU-27 to agree on any accession date. But it is certainly not forbidden to Member States for whom Turkey's membership is essential to utter 2023. When sceptics bash Turkey, these other countries should be able to say as loudly as possible, ‘We want to see Turkey among us by such and such date.’ And they should say it in Europe, not in Turkey. This is the kind of communication we need.
Confidence building and progressive integration
While undergoing the harmonisation works for full membership expected in 2023, Turkey's EU relationship could be upgraded with a number of interim measures pertaining to the customs union and to progressive integration with selected common policies without necessarily waiting for the final accession. Such initiatives and decisions, if properly introduced, could act as solid confidence-building measures and soothe the sceptics on both sides. To begin with, the customs union which has been in place between Turkey and the EU since 31 January 1996 does not function smoothly anymore. Its daily implementation openly harms the Turkish side for three sets of reasons.
First, EU countries refuse to consider the transportation of goods as part of the Customs Union Agreement. Consequently, Turkish exporters to EU countries have to obey the same quota rules applying to third countries regarding their transportation fleet. Despite the fact that transportation of goods is the normal consequence of any trade, this measure punishes the Turkish export industry by increasing the costs of products in EU markets. These tacit barriers to trade within the customs union could and should be reviewed.
Second, according to the customs union decision, Article 16, Turkey has to adopt the common trade policy of the EU. But when the EU concludes free trade agreements (FTA) with third countries it does not consult with Turkey, who does not take part in all decision-making bodies relating to the customs union. Turkey attends technical committees working under the authority of the Commission as an observer, that is, without having the right to vote. In particular, Turkish experts do not have the right to attend meetings of Committee 133, which has a vital role in determining the EU's trade policies. Therefore, when the EU signs FTAs with third countries it means that Turkey is signing an FTA indirectly and often unilaterally with those third countries. Indeed, third countries do not always wish to conclude the same agreement with Turkey, since they do not want to grant the same concessions they grant to the EU. This not only leads Turkey to fail to fulfil its obligation stemming from Article 16 but also to experience trade imbalances. Turkey systematically asks the EU to insert a provision obliging third-party states to conclude similar FTAs with Turkey or not to let the FTAs enter into force until the third party state signs and ratifies such an agreement with Turkey. Although concluding FTAs with third countries would certainly be beneficial for Turkey's foreign trade, the EU's FTAs with third countries hamper Turkey. This longstanding issue could and should be addressed.
Third, an issue on which the EU could develop a proactive approach is its visa policy. Turkey is almost the only country that has substantial economic, cultural and political relations with the EU whose nationals are subject to a very stringent visa regime for entry into EU territory. No exceptions for particular groups such as businessmen, students or EU project partners is foreseen. This creates an unfair advantage for businessmen from EU countries who can travel visa free or at minimum cost to Turkey, whereas Turkish businessmen have to queue for visas without having the guarantee of getting one. So far negotiations have produced no tangible results despite pro-Turkey rulings in national courts (the UK) and the European Court of Justice. Finding a mutually acceptable solution on easing visa requirements by taking into consideration legitimate concerns of both parties would be an important incentive for Turkish public opinion regarding future EU membership prospects.
The progressive integration of Turkey into a variety of EU policies, once the requirements are fulfilled through negotiations, could be a decisive policy tool to increase levels of confidence. Turkey already participates in a number of EU programmes such as the Research Framework Programme and the European Environment Agency. Moreover, through the customs union Turkey is partially integrated into the common market and applies a number of EC common laws. A new approach to further this integration throughout the negotiation chapters that are successfully concluded could be contemplated in order to build ties on the road to accession in 2023.
Last but not least is the upcoming Cyprus decision, which concerns the EU's decision of December 2006 to freeze eight of the 35 chapters of Turkey's accession negotiations for non-compliance with the requirements of the Additional Protocol to the customs union agreement, namely, that Turkey include the Republic of Cyprus within the customs union framework as a new member. Having understood the intimate relationship between the reunification talks and the fate of Turkey's own negotiations with the EU, the Swedish presidency spent much time shuttling between Europe, Turkey and Cyprus to support the negotiating duo of Christofias and Talat. Sweden has now set up the ‘Cyprus Working Group’ in Stockholm.
Similarly, an informal group of ‘like-minded countries on Turkey's EU membership’, formed in Ankara some time ago, is gathering pace. The group initiated by Britain, Italy, Spain and Sweden has expanded with the participation of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland. Denmark and the Netherlands are said to be providing occasional support to the group that may be reinforced in the months to come. On the other side, the results of the September 2009 elections in Germany will show whether the new German government will be at odds with Swedish and Spanish efforts regarding Turkey's negotiations.
Finally, these efforts could find friendly ears from the present time until the end of 2011, during which we will have presidencies from five proponent Member States: now Sweden, then Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland.
Keep the winds blowing
Europe is already on the move in Turkey and no one should have the privilege of halting this dynamic. We are undoubtedly at the beginnings of a long journey and the stakes are high. There will be strong undercurrents threatening to derail the process and jeopardise our common future based on shared values and mutual interests. It would be unfortunate to abandon the courageous political vision initiated in Helsinki at the very beginning of the journey when things have just started to brew. We should always remember that the arguments put forth by political forces and lobbies in Turkey and in Western Europe against Turkey's membership conflict with the vision of Europe as a world power. Turkey's difference and its somewhat long period of normalisation will certainly continue to provide its opponents with much ammunition. We shall not let them have the last word, lest our common future turn into a common chaos.