Abstract
At the end of the Cold War era, Bulgaria succeeded in swiftly creating a democratic political and institutional system. In spite of these rapid achievements, the process of transition has proved slow and incoherent. The disappearance of external security and internal stability ensured by participation in the communist bloc has caused confusion if not discontent in the population. As a consequence, economic and political reforms have been delayed, compromising the trust of Bulgarians in the new democratic institutions. This article sheds lights on these developments in Bulgaria's multifaceted transition towards democracy, underscoring its historical peculiarities. It explores the main challenges of Bulgarian politics—trust building, weak grass-roots participation and the extreme fragmentation of the political landscape—and identifies possible solutions.
Introduction
Bulgarian democracy has achieved its objective goals—established democratic institutions, a functioning multi-party system. The level of public approval for the way it functions, however, remains comparatively low. This fact, established by a series of studies, shows that the Bulgarian democratic system has not yet reached a state that satisfies all Bulgarian citizens and makes them fully confident in the advantages of this type of government. The root of these attitudes lies in the historical peculiarities of the Bulgarian transition. The reason it has not been possible to overcome these attitudes is found in the imperfections of the political effort made to build up Bulgarian democracy.
The transition in Bulgaria, after the long years under the totalitarian regime, was a difficult and contentious process. It was undertaken not ‘because of’ but ‘in spite of’ the objectives in the country. There was a lack of democratic traditions and models of political and public behaviour. The basic moral norms of political life had not been internalised. Knowledge of the basic practices of democracy was lacking, and there was an aloofness towards Christian and religious values. Separation from the policies and practices of the authoritarian state was difficult and wrenching for Bulgarians. It was historically necessary and even desired to some degree. But at the same time it was emotionally and vitally difficult for others. The human dimensions of the Bulgarian transition took the form of a painful parting with a personal past, which a great number of the Bulgarians remembered as happy and satisfactory. Not because that was their political assessment of the years of socialist rule but because they had spent their youthful years, their active life, in that period. The memory of their compromises and the victims of that time had passed. This made the parting with socialism emotionally difficult for Bulgarians.
The transition to democracy in Bulgaria
On the social level, the difficulties in realising the transition stemmed from the loss of stability and the lack of guarantees for safety which the totalitarian state had provided. On the political level, Bulgaria was no longer a part of the system of Soviet satellite states and their economic and military organisations. There had been a strict system of restricted freedom, but the state had taken responsibility for personal and public development. The sense of personal safety dulled the desire for political change and a desire to experiment with fundamental civil rights and freedoms. Generations of Bulgarians had not developed the ability to fight and stand up their positions, to search for the truth and be critical in their attitude towards the state.
At the beginning of the changes taking place after 1989, Bulgarian society was on the threshold of a new and unfamiliar reality. It gave Bulgarian citizens democracy but also required them to accept those public norms which until then had been considered wrong. The most significant challenge before the nation was the fact that it had lost sight of the need for personal and public development. This change in the logic of personal and public life created diverse attitudes towards the new mode of government and the potential of democracy as a system.
In such a complicated situation a large number of Bulgarians desired external change but protested against the idea that they too had to change. The confusion was further increased by the fact that it was politically preferable that the details of the transition be unknown in advance, even to the new elite. In public discussion about the new future, the issue was not whether but by whom the transition should be carried out. The strong roots of the Communist Party meant that it was able to keep control over the situation for a long enough period to discredit the changes. Thus the implementation of economic and political reforms was delayed and the role and place of the new democratic institutions were to some extent compromised in the eyes of the citizens. They were witnesses to contradictory and fruitless political behaviour, the demagoguery and hypocrisy of the new elite, which for the most part tried to change things so as to favour themselves.
The formal changes in the system of government were implemented comparatively quickly after the ratification of the new Constitution in 1991. Although the behaviour of the public stimulated and sometimes even dictated the political decisions, parliamentary democracy begun to function even though it had all the imperfections of its Bulgarian variant. At their core, however, the processes of political transformation were carried out slowly and incoherently. The changes in ownership brought about by restitution and nationalisation also changed the base of real political power. But it was the people who in the first years of unregulated transition seized positions of power and illegally seized public resources. Bulgarians who had suffered under the old regime and those who wished for a radical change orientated themselves towards the parties of the right. Relatively powerless Bulgarians, together with those of the former communist elite who had quickly enriched themselves, remained around the left-wing party, the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party).
The result, contrary to the usual expectations, was that the Bulgarian left supported the sustaining of traditional politics. The Bulgarian right included those who were looking for change and reform and were orientated towards destroying the received political and economic models. That basic disparity between political ideas and classical ideology confused the full development and function of the parties. The parties of transition could not transcend their initial ideas for change and find the new ideas with which to attract their natural constituency. They were not able to become effective political organisations able to attract those who sympathised with them and to carry out policies in keeping with their declared identity.
The former Communist Party has become the home of diverse groups with conflicting interests. What keeps them still united at present is the symbiotic relationships between their members: the poor fathers and the rich sons now stand together; the socially disadvantaged and unprotected next to those who have always been labelled by them as exploiters. The biggest leftist party still remains internally conflicted not only in its membership but also in its policy. This causes additional confusion and disappointment among the citizens, especially among those who sympathise with them. Suffering from a lack of ideas for government, they are incapable of political compromises. Their latest actions proved to be a source of discontent with the party's behaviour because they did not follow principles but power and financial interests instead. Today the most monolithic and clearly defined left-wing party is more likely to promote right-wing economic measures. This simply increases public disappointment and confusion, because these measures are in conflict with the expectations which the BSP itself has created.
The right-wing parties, being promoters of change, were created and grouped on the basis of their anti-communism. This also united social groups with heterogeneous members—from those who sincerely desired change to those who wanted it for the personal rehabilitation it would bring and the attendant social compensations. The exhaustion of the anti-communist movement was not enough for the acceptance of the new right-wing ideas for reform, after the significant and belated reforms from the end of the nineties. The centre-right political space ended up being torn apart.
The challenges to Bulgarian democracy
Today the Bulgarian centre-right political space has a sound social base of support—the large and increasing share of people with economic initiative and effectiveness, confident in their own abilities and capacity. This group now encompasses about one-fifth of the Bulgarian population. It demands a full democracy, reliable institutions and strong rules, and because of this it is still searching for strong and credible political representation. The most recent polls from February 2008 show that one-third of all voters and at least 60% of Bulgarians defining themselves as right-orientated have recognised GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) as representing their political interests.
The development of the political system in Bulgaria as well as the stabilisation of parties on the left and right of the political spectrum occurred under the sign and influence of the transition towards a market economy and democracy. This predetermined the ambivalent result of both processes.
Each government during the transition had to spend untold efforts to reform society and to build up its own party structure at the same time. The results on both fronts, therefore, were not as effective as expected. Because of this, Bulgarian society today lives with the sense that the transition has not been implemented in the way it should have been, that the parties and their leaders did not fulfil their mission and that Bulgarian democracy does not function so as to meet the requirements of a large part of its citizens.
The difficult transition and the historical and social features specific to Bulgaria predetermined the sequence of paradoxes leading the present political situation. These paradoxes are evident in the following features of Bulgarian democracy:
First, there is a large number of parties (300 at the moment), each with relatively few members and supporters. The two tendencies are developing in different directions. The increase in the number of new parties obviously provokes a decrease in voter turnout. Today, we know that the more parties there are, the fewer voters there will be. This shows that the multiplicity of parties is no longer a sign of better representation, but grounds for its discredit.
Second, there is a large and relatively developed political and party elite combined with a low trust in political representatives. With a few exceptions, public trust in them remains low; the level of distrust is still higher than the level of trust. As a result, the leaders and their parties have a short and insignificant political existence. This reflects directly on attitudes towards the political system and political parties. What is more, they are perceived as the reason for public problems and failures.
Third, there is a shortage of new faces in politics; the lack of mechanisms that naturally brings new people into politics brings additional challenges to Bulgarian democracy. Democracy within the parties themselves does not function in a natural way, and if it is not able to exist in a political organisation, it cannot be applied in society either. The mechanisms of political recruitment and growth are not working well enough; they are not transparent and available to anyone who is sincerely politically oriented. This restricts the possibility for the natural development of the parties and the importing of new political ideas.
Furthermore, there is the presence of numerous civic organisations on the one hand combined with low civic activity on behalf civil causes and rights on the other. In Bulgaria, the natural formation of a civil society through the realisation of the interests and strengths of a significant segment of the public has not yet occurred. Civil institutions appeared to be supported, but they were instigated with help from abroad. This did not sufficiently stimulate the natural civic sensitivity and activity to a level in which it becomes a real factor in public progress. A series of governments in the years of transition, deliberately or not, eliminated or underestimated the opinions of civil society when there were important decisions to be made. The legislation in the country does not stimulate the application of direct democracy. And the political culture of government has not reached the level at which public opinion serves as a corrective.
Also, weak civic participation predicts low electoral activity. This has been even more strongly undermined by the latest incident of vote buying, for the benefit of certain politicians who skirt the political rules by trying to pay for votes. The phenomenon is becoming so pervasive that it is beginning to look as if democracy is for sale. This too discredits democracy in the eyes of the Bulgarians. The confidence of the citizens that they can make a difference by voting remains low.
In addition, attempts to bypass or fool the electorate completely destroys the norm of political loyalty and succession. Voters refuse to be loyal to parties that have not stayed loyal to their political platform. This destabilises political organisations, but also makes the whole political system so unstable that it appears unnecessary. Of those citizens eligible to vote, 45% declare that they have changed their choice in the last years. This electoral ‘nomadism’ gives opportunity for forming dangerous political coalitions. At the moment the country is being governed by a political conglomerate that is incoherent in relation to the platforms and promises of each of the parties in it. The most important governing decisions are made by an illegitimate organ—a council of the coalition which is not regulated by the Constitution, not accountable to Parliament and not transparent to society. This means that it is possible to gain power in ways not legitimately sanctioned by the democratic vote of Bulgarians.
Another sign of this democratic paradox can be seen in the presence of both highly developed European legislation and at the same time actively corrupting anomalies. Corruption is spreading—from the first level of citizens’ contact with the organs and clerks making decisions to the highest levels of political and constitutional power. This is not an exception but the common model of political behaviour. The accumulation of different corrupting tendencies in the country shows that a corrosive feature of authority has already developed. Such a state of affairs destroys legitimacy, because decisions are made not by avoiding corruption, but by using it in a creative way. The political system and the civil society of Bulgaria still haven't developed a resistance to this disease of the transition to democracy, and it is starting to be perceived as a major vice of democracy.
These features of the Bulgarian system of democratic development have an impact on the trust of the citizens in the state institutions. Today, the Bulgarian Parliament has the lowest levels of trust and respect for its work since the transition to democracy. All of the political components within it share similarly low levels of trust—the parties in power as well as the parties in the opposition. One cannot be satisfied with a democratic system of government without respect for its institutions and procedures. The lack of stability, steady development, openness and effectiveness of the democracy has created and sustains the present levels of dissatisfaction with it.
Historical circumstances and personal and party merits and mistakes are the background against which it is clear that the main reason for the dissatisfaction of Bulgarians with the way the Bulgarian democracy is functioning today is the lack of open and effective policy. Our society needs to know where it is going and how it is going to achieve its aims. It demands clear efforts in order to achieve this. The people of Bulgaria are wise and aware of the fact that mistakes can be made due to real and sincere efforts. That is why they can be forgiven, as long as the national interest informs the motivation behind the efforts, the goals are clear and concrete results are sought. Promises are no longer enough.
Leading Bulgaria towards successful democracy
In order to restore faith in the power of democracy and encourage citizens to take part in the proper functioning of Bulgaria, the following are needed:
A new kind of political actor is required. Whether long-standing or newly appointed, they should be members of adequately and effectively functioning organisations. The parties of the transition cannot be internally ineffective and socially beneficial at the same time. They should be well organised and represent their supporters and members as well as being intent on promoting their aims in society. Adequate internal democracy can guarantee the health of democracy within the society.
Stable and effective institutions of the executive authority must be established. They should be managed and act with minimal bureaucracy, clear rules and without corruption compromising all political efforts. The strengthening of institutions by giving them modern structure, functionality and transparency of action can guarantee this order that our country needs.
Effective local authorities must be put in place. The achievements here are not few, but only when the results of these efforts are seen to stand out from the government will Bulgarians believe in the potential of local democracy.
Openness and respect for law and order in the work of the main institutions of authority—legislation and Parliament—must be realised. The behaviour of civic officials, Members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors should meet the requirements of political and public morality. Public norms should apply to them as equally as they do to all Bulgarian citizens.
Effective policies for achieving specific results by the authorities at every level must be adopted. This will restore the confidence of Bulgarians that the power given by their vote has meaning and value. Only those political and governmental actions that solve specific problems in a quick and effective way can convince the citizens of Bulgaria of the power of democracy.
The Bulgarian government must implement mechanisms of direct democracy at all levels of authority. In Bulgaria, we still cannot boast about achievements in this field. These mechanisms should be guaranteed by law and their use be made possible and effective. But what we need to combat is the distrust in direct democracy. This should be done by the people who apply it as well as by the people who take part in it.
Finally, fighting and thereby limiting political corruption should be the first priority of any government in Bulgaria. This social disease is spreading to many different levels and is present in a variety of forms. We have the necessary legislation to guarantee justice and transparency of public activities. We have the organs that should limit corruption. But results that please us have still not been achieved. First, why is there no political will to make this happen? Second, why is the civic energy to prevent corruption still weak and not motivated? To win the fight against corruption we need a strong civil society and efficiently functioning civic organisations.
To overcome the compounding effects of these problems, Bulgarian society needs to meet some important conditions. First, it must aim for national revival. Second, it must make some important changes to ensure economic, political and democratic development. Finally, it must aim at stability, not in a static way, but by repeating steps that have been successful in politics and the economy as well as in the whole system of democracy.
We can bring these aims of ours about because we have four key resources. First, we belong to the European family. This gives us a framework and direction, which helps us overcome our regional problems more quickly and become part of European standards.
Second, there is a new business and social environment in the country. The accelerated economic development is due to adequate marketing mechanisms, by which more and more public fields are being developed. These mechanisms need to be broadened and maintained in order to make more and more Bulgarians happy with their personal and public well being. If we succeed in this, we will inevitably strengthen society and help deepen attachment to democracy.
Third, we have available to us the modern technologies that will ensure our future as a part of the global world. The modernisation of each social or professional field and activity of Bulgarian society will make our whole political and public life more effective and develop quicker. The feeling of being a part of the global world will motivate Bulgarians to find their personal opportunities for development and realisation, too. This does not mean that we should neglect our national characteristics and culture; rather, we should preserve them, appreciate them and develop them in the best way possible for the modern world.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we have the most valuable resource—Bulgarians, who want a better life today and are ready to apply all their efforts to achieve it. The human capital of the country is valuable and full of qualities that give it cause to feel it is part of the European democratic community.
Establishing these aims and realising to the full our resources and our will, we can continue to develop the Bulgarian democratic system. An effort like this can be fulfilled only when responsibility is shared by all the parties taking part in this process. This means responsibility for the people by the government and by politicians for everything they say or do, and the responsibility of the Bulgarian parties and institutions. This requires that every single citizen accept her or his responsibilities as well, for the way they treat society, and for readiness to participate in the democratic development of the country.
Footnotes