Post-communist Tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

The communist elites in Central and Eastern Europe anticipated the collapse of the communist system well before others in their countries, and started to prepare themselves with the goal of preserving their privileged position in the society. They developed skills for leading positions in a free economy through training not available to others and became the predominant owners in their national economies through privatisation processes that they controlled. This power basis allowed them to develop a strong political infrastructure, which attracted enough voters that the elites could exert significant influence on national politics and take care of their own interests. In this paper, those political decisions that are exclusively in the interest of these former elites are termed ‘post-communist tendencies’.

To understand the roots of post-communist tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe one has to reflect, at least briefly, on the political, economic and intellectual situation in those countries in roughly the last two decades before the two decisive years of change in 1989 and 1990. The communist elites were confident that they would prevail in the confrontation with the democracies of Western Europe and North America and that their expectations about a global proletarian revolution would materialise. Their confidence was at its peak at the time of the launch of the first Sputnik. The Western democracies, especially the US, followed with successes in computer technology, the development of high-tech weaponry and in space. The landing on the moon was definitely one of the defining moments; this achievement could not be matched by communist powers, and their self-confidence began to erode. The other factor contributing to the erosion of communist self-confidence was the considerable difference in the rates of the economic development between Western and Eastern Europe. Here I give only one example of these developments. Slovenia, at that time a part of Yugoslavia, had the same GDP per capita as Austria in 1970. Nineteen years later, at the time of democratic changes, it was only one quarter of what our neighbour had. The economic stagnation and decline in the other Central and Eastern European countries was of the same magnitude, if not even worse. The problems the communist countries were having with their economies and levels of innovation were much better understood by analysts in the West, especially in the US, than by the dissidents at home. The leading dissidents came out of literary and liberal arts intellectual circles, having little understanding or even appreciation of such down-to-earth questions as economics and technological development. The Reagan administration, however, took note of what US political and economic analysts were saying, and immediately after its inauguration proclaimed ‘war on the evil empire’ [1], with the goal to widen the technological and economic gap between the democracies of the West and communist countries, and in this way to induce the collapse of the communist regimes. This war put increased pressure on the weak spots of communist countries, where they were most vulnerable. The Reagan administration prevented the crucial technologies developed in the West from being transferred to the communist countries. To make the widening technological gap apparent to the military-political elites of those countries, the US started a programme of development of high-tech weaponry that could not be matched by the Soviets. This programme was misunderstood even by some political analysts in the West and nicknamed ‘Star Wars’. It should be acknowledged, however, that it was an important influence on the situation in the communist part of the world. It clearly demonstrated that the communists would not be able to maintain the military balance despite high material sacrifices, and exerted significant pressure on their weakening, technologically outdated economies.

These developments had two important consequences. The first was an internal split in the communist parties, between those who conceded that the communist system would need to undergo far-reaching changes in order to survive, and the orthodox who advocated more of the same. The first point of view prevailed in the communist parties of some countries and the second in others. An example of the latter is Ceausescu's Romania. On the other hand there was perestroika in the Soviet Union and the process of ‘stepping down from power’ in Yugoslavia, where this process was understood differently in each of the federal republics. From the beginning of the 1980s the communist parties became much less coherent and started to split internally over which direction to choose. The second consequence was that the falling standard of living led to unrest among the general public. This unrest was generally very mild and incoherent due to intimidation by the police and the judicial system. It was, however, noticed by the communist elites and in this respect contributed significantly to their loss of self-confidence.

Even in the countries where considerable changes in the political and economic system were considered, the communist elites never intended to introduce the reforms, which would lead to democratic and egalitarian societies typical in the West. They simply wanted to preserve their privileged status as a national elite, even in a changed political and economic system. If the new system were to resemble the more successful Western model, or even be much better, it would be acceptable to them. Their goals were, therefore, very clear: to preserve their status as the dominant group in society, and to make the reformed system at least economically viable, if not successful. These ideas and intentions were of course hidden from the general public behind a thick wall of conspiracy. Even today we have only hints about what their real intentions were, or why they followed some political options and not the others. It should be very clear, however, that the communist elites had much more time and resources to prepare for the changes in the political system then the emerging political opposition, who were unclear about their goals and without any resources; not yet legal but tolerated, never knowing for how long. The transitional processes, therefore, were introduced and controlled to a considerable extent by the communist elites. They understood much more clearly the importance of property reform for the future shape of their countries than did the new pro-democracy movements. The first privatisation reforms in the Soviet Union as well as in Yugoslavia were introduced around 1987 by the still completely communist-controlled governments of Gorbachev and Marković, respectively. The goal of these reforms was that the state-owned industries and real estate, controlled in the past and enjoyed by communist elites through political means, would become the property of these elites and their source of influence in society. Their newly acquired wealth would guarantee their materially and politically privileged status in the reformed system as well. The first democratically elected governments were unaware of the importance of what was happening and so were not able to stop or undo the privatisation processes already underway. They modified them and made them considerably fairer; the final outcome, however, was largely what the former communist elites had wished. The resulting distribution of wealth is definitely one very important source of post-communist tendencies in Central and East European countries.

To consider the other source of post-communist tendencies, human resources, or the skills needed to succeed in a free economy, we should turn our attention to a period roughly half a dozen years earlier. A brief analysis shows that at the beginning of the 1980s, the communist elites were too under-educated to be successful in the competitive environment of a free economy. Their privileges were not derived from their personal competence. They were based exclusively on their position in the political system. The sources of their power were the secret police and the military. The communist reformers were well aware of this problem. Looking back, we must admit that they knew they would have to correct it before liberalising the economy. The issue of human resources was and still is much more hidden and can hardly be proven. Therefore I will limit my comments to Slovenia only, about which I have some informal sources of information, and will omit naming names, because very little of what I have to say can be proven in a court of law; or, it could be considered as personal data. In 1982, a number of well-educated persons with impeccable political credentials from the communist point of view were sent to study in the US on scholarships granted by the Central Committee of the Slovenian Communist Party. This in itself was already a surprise; an even greater surprise was their chosen fields of study. These were all completely useless for persons living in a state under communist rule. They were studying stock exchanges, for example, or investment banking and public finances, which exist, of course, only in democratic societies. Upon returning home, most of them got leading positions in banking and in the economy of the democratic Slovenia, thus shaping its political and economic decisions. These posts were reserved for the elite of the communist party only, and so the communist reformers also started the build-up in human resources at home. To serve somewhat broader circles in society, the Central Committee, at approximately this time, also started and in the beginning even operated two management schools, one at the graduate and one at the post-graduate level. In the beginning and until the introduction of democracy, the enrolment was restricted to persons with some experience in leading positions in the economy and in public administration. These positions were, in a communist-dominated society, reserved for elite party members. The persons who could enrol were screened even more by means of extremely high tuition, which nobody could pay out of his or her own pocket. Again, it was paid for by the Central Committee, usually through some mediator like enterprises or agencies well under their control. I have to add here that no one outside the circle of the most highly trusted had access to an education in management and non-communist economics before the advent of democratic change, with the exception of a few who succeeded in getting an education in Western countries and were willing to return home.

When the changes to the economy and the political system were introduced they gained momentum; they developed quickly and not always according to the wishes of the ruling communist parties. The opposition circles felt that changes were now possible, and so they worked for them—not only for small corrections, but for the introduction of a fully democratically governed state, civil rights and free economy. Communists often lost control of events, but they did succeed in achieving their principal goal of gaining the ownership of the formerly state-owned enterprises and real estate, to a large extent intact. It is, however, at least for me, a disappointment to have to admit that they were aided considerably in this process by some important Western powers and political parties. There were two more or less important reasons for this. The first was the fear among many that in the event of the uncontrolled disintegration of the Soviet Union, some parts of its mighty nuclear arsenal might fall into the hands of some states or political groups that represented a serious threat to the security of the world's democracies. The Western powers hoped that if the communist elite would be able to preserve its privileged status by getting hands on the national wealth, the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be more gradual and the danger of the proliferation of nuclear arms would be less pronounced. Events proved them wrong on both accounts. First, proliferation did occur. Some Soviet nuclear experts took their expertise to India and others to Pakistan, which would as a result build the first ‘Islamic bomb’. To what extent the Iranian nuclear programme has been aided by Soviet technology is hard for me to say. Some technological solutions indicate that the transfer of knowledge between the former Soviet Union and Iran was not negligible. As we can see, proliferation in very unstable countries hostile to the West did occur. Second, through their newly acquired wealth the former communist elites could keep their privileged position and to a large extent the control of their countries, despite the democratic reforms that resulted in formally democratic systems with free elections. The well-known Russian chess player and former world master, Gary Kasparov, newly a political leader, described this situation at the last EIN (European Ideas Network) meeting in Warsaw in September 2007 as ‘KGB Incorporated’. The situation is not so bad by far in other post-communist countries; it varies from one country to the other. It is, however, true for all of them that the former communist elites acquired a disproportional part of the national wealth and that they are using it for political purposes.

The other tactic used by the former communist elites to preserve their privileges was the multiple renaming, splitting and recombining of their political organisation, well known from the former totalitarian period. The result of this manoeuvring was a series of new, formally democratic parties with formally social-democratic or, to a lesser extent, liberal orientation and with predominantly the same old membership. As their origins were and still are the weak spot of their credentials, they relied on financing, which was usually at least adequate, from the newly rich former communist elite, as opposed to the real democratic parties with roots in the pro-democracy movements of the years 1989 and 1990, which had fewer financial resources. The favourable financial situation of the older parties permitted them to retain a large staff well trained in political manoeuvring. Although the communist party schools of the previous system had been ridiculed by opposition-minded people, including myself, we now have to admit, however, that besides the infantile communist rhetoric, these schools taught their students the fundamentals of political manoeuvring very well. These transformed communist parties would not be as successful as they now are, despite their more-than-solid organisational capacity and financing, if they did not receive international recognition as democratic through being admitted into the European and international organisations of the Social Democrats and the Liberals. These admissions had far-reaching consequences. The voters at home in the Central and Eastern European countries understood this as certifying that these parties were truly democratic, no longer connected to the old system and serving the interests of its elite, and therefore worthy of their confidence.

The action of European Social Democrats and Liberals in giving the reformed Communists the democratic licence has also had another far-reaching consequence. Well-organised, financed and endowed with newly acquired certification as democratic, the reformed Communist parties with their roots in the political organisations of the totalitarian regimes could claim the social democratic and liberal part of the political spectrum for themselves. The newly founded parties of these orientations of democratic provenance were not able to compete with them, and because of their lack of electoral success slowly disappeared or joined the former Communists. As a consequence of these developments, the parties of democratic origin are all compressed into the part of political spectrum covered by the EPP. To appreciate the meaning of that, we should take a look at the political situation in Western Europe, where we can see how difficult it is and how seldom it comes about that the member parties of the EPP can form a government by themselves. The recent and present cases of Austria and Germany, for example, clearly demonstrate this situation. And if we take, for example, the present Slovenian government, we can see that despite the more-than-solid electoral victory of the Slovenian Democratic Party they were not able to form the government alone or with the other two parties that are members of the EPP. They have to invite and accept into the ruling coalition a fourth party of somewhat questionable provenance. Despite being the smallest partner of the four in the coalition, the fourth party is still able, under the pretext of national interests, to stall some important governmental decisions, which would privatise some vital sectors of the Slovenian economy like banking and insurance and open the Slovenian market more widely to competition. It can easily be seen that what is really meant by the phrase ‘national interests’, which sounds very well in the political arena, are the interests of the former communist elite. This clearly shows that compressing all the parties of democratic origin into the EPP part of political spectrum considerably limits their ability to take independent political action, even when they are able to form a government, and to bring the transition period to an end in a fair and transparent way. In this way the interests of the former communist elite can be served and post-communist tendencies preserved.

Post-communist tendencies in Central and Eastern European countries also receive significant support from the local media. The level of support is not the same in all sectors. National television and radio, despite the fact that they are politically controlled to a certain extent, are providing the fairest reporting on major economic and political issues. This is due precisely to the fact that they are under the political control carried out by the parliament, where all political options are represented in a more or less fair way. The other representatives of the media can be divided into two groups. Apart from national TV and radio, the print and electronic media that existed before the collapse of the communist regime was privatised. And as in the case of other industries, the members of the former communist elite were able to acquire a majority of the shares. They learned very quickly how to influence the editorial policy of these media; what they had done before the collapse through the well-known methods of totalitarian regimes they now did through the rights the democratic system and market economy give to owners. They used and use these media without any restraints to protect their interests and their unjustified privileges. The media established after the political changes, predominantly by new political forces, were faced with considerable problems concerning their financing. It is well known that there is no newspaper, journal or any other kind of media that can be published only with money earned from sales. A significant portion of it must come from advertising. As the new owners of enterprises, the former communist elite used this fact very skilfully to force any newspaper they did not like out of the market, or to compel it to change its editorial policy. An example of this kind of media control is a newspaper that was started by a group of people close to the Slovenian Christian Democrats in 1992. It attracted enough readers and sold enough copies that in normal conditions it would be a viable and prosperous newspaper. It could not, however, attract enough advertisement from companies controlled by the former communist elite. After 2 years it had to close down with considerable losses for the people who started it. This lesson has been well understood by other publishers and has significantly shaped the media profile in Slovenia. I am convinced that the situation is not very different in other Central and Eastern European countries.

Let me conclude with the statement that post-communist tendencies in the Central and Eastern European countries are identical to and cohere with the policies that suit the interests of former communist elites. These established strong power bases for themselves just before and during the transition period through the privatisation processes and human resource development policies that they controlled or at least influenced to a large extent. Their positions were further strengthened by the hasty and unquestioning acceptance of their renamed parties and political organisations into the democratic spectrum of European politics by Social Democrats and to lesser extent by Liberals. It is, on the other hand, also clear that post-communist tendencies are a direct negation of the principles of freedom and equality, which are the foundations of any true democracy. The tendencies are in fact a well-camouflaged attempt to preserve, even after the democratic changes, the inequalities that had existed in the communist totalitarian societies in Central and Eastern Europe. They should, therefore, be considered not as another democratically expressed political position but as a deficiency in and aberration of democracy. To strengthen democracy in Central and Eastern European countries, the real essence of the post-communist tendencies must be explained again and again to the general public. We should openly and on a case-by-case basis say that these tendencies, although promoted under the cover of national interests, promote inequalities in society and are an attempt to preserve the unjustly earned privileges of the former communist elites. This paper is a modest attempt to analyse the post-communist tendencies from a democratic point of view, in order to reveal the ways they operate and to explain their true goals.