Abstract
The European Union must devote more time and attention to developing a strong strategic relationship with Indonesia, one of Asia's most dynamic economies, a vibrant democracy and a moderate Muslim nation. Currently courted by the US, China and Australia, Indonesia is looking for a closer partnership with Europe. EU policymakers must seize the opportunity and act rapidly to engage Jakarta, a move which will also boost Europe's standing in the rest of Asia.
Keywords
Introduction
Indonesia's rise is arguably one of Asia's most exciting—albeit often underestimated—success stories. After three decades of authoritarian rule under President Suharto, Indonesia has emerged as a robust and dynamic democracy. It is a key Asian member of the G-20, an acknowledged leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, as the world's most populous Muslim nation (albeit with a secular constitution), a moderating force within the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Within South-East Asia, Indonesia is the driving force behind many Asian integration initiatives and has become a strong advocate of human rights and democracy. In addition, with half of the world's trade passing its northern maritime border, Indonesia has a strategic role in ensuring safe and secure international navigation. Impressive growth rates, access to a young and educated labour force, and vast domestic natural resources will ensure that Indonesia's economy continues to thrive in the coming years.
Indonesia's transformation is having an impact on both the region and the wider world. Key players within the neighbourhood are scrambling to forge closer ties with Jakarta: China is engaged in a charm and business offensive, India and Indonesia have just launched negotiations on a trade and economic treaty, and Australia has opened a special people-to-people dialogue to further enhance EU–Indonesian relations. Japan and Taiwan continue to be leading investors. It is Indonesia's partners in ASEAN, however, that are watching Indonesia's changing regional and global profile with the most interest—and a degree of wariness. There is concern that as it becomes stronger and more ambitious, Indonesia may be ready to break away from ASEAN, charting an independent course which would include new emphasis on human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
President Barack Obama has put Indonesia high on the foreign policy agenda of the US. His visit to the country in November 2010 was viewed as a strong endorsement of Indonesia's growing global clout. However, the EU is lagging far behind. The EU has yet to fully recognise Indonesia's changing regional and global profile in either words or deeds. A key foreign policy challenge for European governments is to inject more depth and substance into their still largely uninspiring relationship with the country. The conclusion of an EU–Indonesian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 2009 is a step in the right direction, as are plans to sign a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. However, the relationship needs to become stronger and more strategic, reflecting the changing nature of both Indonesia and the EU. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso are believed to have built up a good personal rapport. This must be further developed and expanded into regular ministerial meetings and high-level visits. Suggestions that the EU and Indonesia hold their first-ever summit and that Indonesia be added to the list of Europe's strategic partners should be investigated further. Forging stronger EU–Indonesia ties is also pivotal if the EU is to hammer out a new strategy for Asia and dispel a growing perception in the region that Europe is irrelevant and insignificant.
Moderate Islam
Indonesia's new foreign policy discourse emphasises its credentials as a democracy, a moderate Muslim nation and a country committed to fighting terrorism. More recently, given its own democratic transition, Indonesian diplomats have been stressing that their country could become a model and inspiration for Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab nations struggling to consolidate democracy [3]. The annual Bali Democracy Forum, launched in 2008, is a showcase for Indonesian democracy and a potent exercise in Indonesian public diplomacy, attracting many countries from both within and without the region. In addition, Indonesia has spearheaded the concept of the archipelagic state in international law, thereby creating a new category of jurisdiction—‘archipelagic waters'—which are recognised as part of the maritime territory of some two dozen archipelagic states around the world [1].
Domestic challenges
Indonesia's rise is not preordained, however. To consolidate its recent successes, Indonesia must confront an array of domestic challenges. The government needs to make faster progress in addressing issues like freedom of expression, military reform, police brutality (especially in Papua) and treatment in prisons and of minorities. President Yudhoyono, the former general turned much-respected democrat, who was re-elected for a second term in 2009, is still struggling to combat corruption. There are suspicions that the government and the police are failing to be tough on Indonesia's Islamic extremists for fear of provoking a backlash, thus allowing intolerance and bigotry to flourish. Critics say the country should put its domestic house in order before preaching human rights and democracy to others in the region. Meanwhile, to maintain its economic growth trajectory, Indonesia must act urgently to attract more investors by improving infrastructure, investment regulations, government procurement rules and property rights.
Relations with ASEAN
Indonesia has long been the driving force behind ASEAN and is still working hard, both publicly and behind the scenes, to inject new vigour and dynamism into it. As part of a ‘concentric circle’ world view, ASEAN is still viewed as Indonesia's closest and most important partner [7]. However, under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia is expanding new and old alliances and seeking to forge strategic partnerships with key players. Jakarta says it is determined not to allow any one major power or group of powers to dominate the region and follows a policy of ‘a thousand friends and zero enemies’ [2]. However, Indonesian diplomats appear frustrated with many aspects of ASEAN, including the border clashes, maritime disputes, ethnic tensions, local insurgencies, and religious violence and extremism in the region.
At times, Indonesia's aspirations of encouraging democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the region—and outside it—have caused particular concern among its neighbours, who fear that Jakarta may be becoming ‘too big’ for ASEAN and the region. Indonesia has certainly increasingly sought to translate its internal reform experience into a strategic democratisation agenda for ASEAN. During the Indonesian presidency of ASEAN in 2011, Jakarta tried to help stem the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, marking a break from the ‘ASEAN way’ of staying out of neighbourhood quarrels. Indonesia gave its full support to ASEAN membership for Timor-Leste, South-East Asia's newest state, which became an independent nation in May 2002 after years of bitter struggle and conflict with Jakarta. Indonesia has also worked untiringly behind the scenes to encourage the current reform process under way in Burma.
A post-ASEAN foreign policy?
The debate among the country's key policymakers and foreign-policy experts on whether Indonesian foreign policy should look beyond ASEAN is fierce and evolving. Indonesian foreign-policy experts argue that to focus solely on ASEAN amid a changing world order, where new powers like China and India are rising and traditional powers like the US, Japan and Russia are set to make a come-back, would reduce Indonesia's global imprint [4]. There is a perception that since Indonesia has been ‘ignored’ by its ASEAN partners on issues such as establishing a credible ASEAN human rights body, it is time that Jakarta adopted a post-ASEAN foreign policy [6]. Breaking free of ASEAN is not an immediate option, however, since it is within the region itself that Indonesia is most visible—and most influential.
Dealing with China's rise
China looms large over Indonesian foreign policy. Jakarta's policy of engaging China involves ‘forging a web of economic, political, diplomatic and cultural ties’, says Daniel Novotny [5, 177]. However, he also notes that the Indonesian elite is ‘ambivalent about China's rise’ [5, 211]. On the one hand, he says, the ‘China threat’ is now conspicuously missing from contemporary official Indonesian political discourse. He notes, however, the ‘relatively high degree’ [5, 213] to which the elite in Indonesia is apprehensive about the uncertainties regarding China's future behaviour and its implications for Indonesian national security, and is fearful of being economically overwhelmed by the country. Today, like other countries, Indonesia is especially uneasy about China's growing military budget and increasing assertiveness in dealing with long-standing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. On the economic front, China's influence reverberates across the region, reinforced by the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area which covers a population of 1.9 billion and involves about $4.5 trillion in trade volume. However, Indonesia has voiced uneasiness over the agreement and has sought to delay its implementation because of fears that many sectors, from steel and petrochemicals to cosmetics and herbal medicines, would face overwhelming competition from cheap Chinese imports.
Relations with the US
Indonesia's strong engagement with the US under President Barack Obama, who spent part of his childhood in Jakarta with his mother and Indonesian stepfather, is a key feature of Jakarta's foreign policy. The US–Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, officially launched in November 2010, is a long-term commitment to elevate bilateral relations by enhancing cooperation and upgrading strategic consultations on key bilateral, regional and global issues including environmental protection, climate change, trade and investment, democracy, health, education, counterterrorism, and regional security issues. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is a frequent visitor to Jakarta and co-chairs an annual joint commission with Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.
Europe lags behind
Europe needs to catch up. If the EU–Indonesia relationship is to take off and fulfil its potential, both sides will have to show political will and leadership. The rewards of a qualitative leap forward in EU–Indonesia relations are enticing—for both sides. EU ambitions of becoming a more powerful and visible actor in Asia depend to a large extent on the development of stronger ties with Jakarta. A nod of approval from Indonesia is essential if the EU is to fulfil its ambitions of joining the East Asia Summit (EAS), following in the footsteps of the US and Russia. Indonesia (and India) is increasingly seen as a powerful Asian counterweight to the rise of China. Finally, closer relations with Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, would also give a much-needed fillip to the EU's standing in the Islamic world.
For Indonesia, the rewards are just as high. Jakarta stands to gain from enhanced cooperation with the EU in areas as diverse as trade and investment, transport, climate change, human rights, immigration, tackling organised crime, and combating communicable diseases. New areas of cooperation should include disaster prevention and preparedness, counterterrorism (including stronger legislation on the financing of terrorism), the exchange of views and practices on de-radicalisation, interfaith questions, security and defence (especially maritime security), and research and development. Stronger ties with the EU would also further highlight Indonesia's quest for a stronger role both within the region and as a global player.
Building a stronger EU–Indonesia relationship will not be easy, however. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed by the two sides in 2009 and plans to sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement provide a good basis for the further development of ties, as does the EU decision to lift the ban imposed in 2007 on Indonesian airlines entering European airspace. However, Indonesia is demanding a change in the Schengen visa regime to allow easier travel for business leaders and students, and also wants improved access to Europe for its palm oil exports. Since both sides recognise the need to boost EU–Indonesia trade and investment flows, the EU should seriously consider these Indonesian requests.
EU Policymakers Should Also
Change the current piecemeal approach to their dealings with Jakarta into a strong, comprehensive strategic partnership. To achieve this, the EU will have to give Indonesia the importance it deserves in a new overall Asian strategy. This means European policymakers must spend as much time and energy weaving stronger ties with Indonesia as they currently do on engagement with China. The EU must recognise the enormous changes that have transformed Indonesia and translate these into a wide-ranging political and economic dialogue with the country.
Crucially, Europeans must engage with Jakarta at the highest level. Currently contacts between EU and Indonesian ministers and senior policymakers are sporadic. The EU's Foreign and Security Policy Representative Catherine Ashton has yet to visit Jakarta and has missed several meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum at which she could have interacted with her Indonesian counterpart.
To remedy this, the EU and Indonesia should agree to hold an annual summit, and Indonesia should be made a strategic partner of the EU, on a par with China, India and Japan.
This could be done by expanding the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to include new areas of cooperation such as disaster preparedness and post-disaster action, as well as anti-piracy initiatives and other joint EU–Indonesian actions to deal with global challenges such as terrorism, extremism and climate change.
Such a qualitative leap forward in EU–Indonesia relations will require hard work, but it can be done if both sides show strong political will and determination.